Ideology, Materialization and Power Strategies

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«A society works best when people want to do, what they have to do...» Eric Fromm

Abstract

Ideology, as a part of culture, is an integral component of human interactions and power strategies that configure sociopolitical systems. We argue that ideology must be materialized, or given concrete form, in order to be a part of the human culture that is shared by a society. This process of materialization makes it possible to control, manipulate, and extend ideology beyond the local group. Ideology is an important source of power; to be controlled it must be rooted in a material medium. To illustrate these concepts three cases are examined: Neolithic and Bronze Age chiefdoms of Denmark, the Moche states of northern Perú, and the Inka empire of the Andes.

Introduction

In recent years many archaeological discussions, coming from both the processual and post-processual perspectives, have focused on the nature and role of ideology in the development of social complexity (Cowgill 1993; Demarest and Conrad 1992; Earle 1991a; Hodder 1982; Miller and Tilley 1984; Renfrew and Zubrow 1994; etc.). The positions taken in these essays have been as diverse as the theoretical backgrounds of their authors, but roughly can be characterized in one of two ways. On one hand, ideology is seen basically as epiphenomenal, as determined by the more persuasive productive aspects of society. On the other hand, ideology has been reduced to the expression of the innerself of the individual, multiplying the number of ideologies at any given time to an equivalent of the individuals’ minds.

The way we look at ideology is rather different. First of all, we recognize that ideology is one of the most important components in a social system. This component is usually closely and even exclusively associated with the most powerful social segments. As archaeologists we see a tremendous limitation in most definitions of ideology, particularly when it is perceived as being composed exclusively of ideas and beliefs—unlikely to appear in the archaeological record. Here is where ours differs from other perspectives. We consider that ideology is as much embedded in the material means to communicate and manipulate ideas, as in the ideas themselves. Furthermore, we think that the archaeological record is particularly rich in these types of expressions, which are very likely to be preserved or passed on.
There are two aspects to these material means of ideology: a symbolic and a material. Symbolic objects and religious monuments of all sorts convey and transmit symbolic information and meanings, standing for and representing them. The symbolic meanings these objects and monuments stand for and represent, and especially how these were perceived by individual actors, are inaccessible to the archaeologist. But as material objects they are part of the fabric of the social, political, and economic aspects of society, revealing patterns of access and manipulation of the power of some social segments over others. Archaeologically we can study differential access to the material expressions of the ideological system, and how this access affected the dynamics of social power.

From this standpoint, the study of ideology in archaeology can contribute to our understanding of power relations. Although we are interested in the symbolic aspect of ideology, the avenue we pursue here is that of ideology as social power, particularly in complex, stratified societies. We are purposely omitting a lengthy discussion of the relationships between ideologies of domination and resistance (McGuire 1992), and we are also setting aside the applicability of our ideas to the study of simple societies. We study, therefore, the relationships between ideological means and relations of domination: What gives primacy to one ideology over another; how can an ideology supporting domination be sustained in the presence of an ideology of resistance? The answer, we argue, is grounded in the processes by which these ideologies become physical, that is in the Materialization of Ideology.

**Ideology and Social Power**

Social power is the capacity to control and manage the labor and activities of a group to gain unequal access to the benefits of social action. Michael Mann (1986) proposed four sources of social power: economic, political, military, and ideological. Throughout history, these four sources have been used in a variety of ways, creating distinct power strategies.

Power strategies are the means by which rulers and ruling social segments combine the sources of social power to pursue their goals. In some instances, these strategies rely heavily on the coercive effects of military action; in others, economic action, that is the production and distribution of goods, has «ultimate primacy.» In still others, as we consider in this paper, ideology plays a basic role in political and social dynamics.

The choice of one power strategy over another has profound implications for the process of social evolution (Earle 1987, n.d.; Johnson and Earle 1987). In essence, the different power strategies represent different routes to social complexity, different means to centralize and to extend the scale of a polity.

The strategic use of each power source depends on the historical circumstances of the social group and its objectives. The selection of one strategy over others involves comparing the effectiveness and costs of implementing particular strategies and the length of time that each can be sustained. Carneiro (1967, 1981), Webster (1985), and others have argued for the significance of military might. For them warfare provides the immediate means to extend political dominance. But military might, although sometimes efficacious in the short-run, is inherently costly and unstable as a means to institutionalize power relationships. It is effective primarily where control over the means of destruction is possible (Goody 1971). Still others (Brumfiel and Earle 1987; Earle 1991a) have argued for the ultimate precedence of economic control by which the evolution of systems of land tenure and property rights permit a direct control over the systems of production and exchange. But control over the economic system is usually problematic except in such extraordinary circumstances as the development of irrigation systems within which an agrarian population can be «caged» (Mann 1986), or in an insular setting where control of the seaways can serve the same function.

In this article we consider the alternative role of ideology in the evolution of social complexity by looking at the emphasis that three complex societies placed on ideology in their power strategies. The relative costs of strategies based on ideology are evaluated and compared with strategies whose priority is alternative sources of power. We argue that, in order to be an effective source of power,
ideology must be «materialized» in distinct and tangible forms, including symbolic objects, ceremonies, monuments, and writing. Materialized ideology, like materialized culture, can achieve the status of shared values and beliefs. Materialization makes it possible to extend ideologies beyond the local group and to communicate the power of a central authority to the broader population.

The materialization of an ideology is a strategic process that allocates resources to strengthen and legitimize institutions of elite control. Thus the character of social power and ideology, and their ties to the economy, will be reflected in the different forms of materialization within a society. Importantly, the costs of materialization make it possible for powerful individuals or social segments to monopolize or restrict access to the material symbols and events that comprise an ideology. When distinct social segments control different resources, each group may actively promote its own ideology through materialization. In this way, power and economic control may shift between groups over time, so that organizational change may result from the strategic activities and competition through which elites build and materialize specific ideologies.

Problems of Definition

Ideology has been systematically defined in two somewhat contradictory ways, a neutral and a critical conception (Thompson 1990). The neutral conception assumes that an ideology is comprised of ideas and beliefs, concepts and modes of thought, religious creeds, and moral norms. Together, these form the mentality of a social group. The neutral conception assumes the perspective of the individual, for whom ideology, as much as cosmological systems and culture, is one component of his world view. In this view, ideology is continually created and re-created through social interaction; it is not necessarily misleading, nor does it serve particular interests (Thompson 1990:52). It is essentially similar to the broader concept of culture (Larrain 1983; McGuire 1992). Freidel’s (1992:116) definition of Maya ideology as «the interconnected fundamental ideas held by the elite and commoners alike about the order of the cosmos and everything it contains» is, for example, indistinguishable from a broad definition of Maya culture. A neutral ideology is the sum of shared experiences and interactions, evident in ritual events, sacred symbols, and ceremonial facilities.

The critical conception of ideology also adopts the perspective that ideology is a system of beliefs and ideas. However, in this view, ideologies are created and manipulated by the ruling elite to establish and maintain their social power. The critical view, more than its neutral counterpart, contributes several important points for the analysis of power relations in society. Ideology is a mechanism used by certain social segments to manipulate, control, suppress, or exploit populations to fulfill their own interests. Not all ideology is, therefore, spontaneously generated through human interaction; a significant part is intentionally created and transformed to direct the thoughts and the actions of subject peoples. Ideology is, in essence, a source of social power.

Louis Althusser (1971, 1990) emphasizes three aspects of the relationship between ideology and power. First, deriving directly from Marx (1977:176), Althusser argues that a ruling ideology at all times leads social consciousness, and expresses the interests of the ruling class. Second, he postulates a close relationship between the state and ideology, conceiving of both as mechanisms for domination by the ruling class (Althusser 1990). Third, he maintains that this close association conditions ideology’s instrumental character. Ideology operates through the actions of specifically designed and state operated institutions, the «ideological state apparatuses» (Althusser 1971).

Althusser’s definition of ideology recognizes the existence of social values and beliefs that contribute to the reproduction of the material conditions of social life, so that the social values have to be constantly reproduced in order to perpetuate the social order. The problem arises when we want to define to what degree these values and beliefs are shared by all individuals, and what mechanisms permit the transmission of shared values and beliefs. Althusser assumes that the action of a class
controlled state lies behind the creation and transmission of ideologies. This state manipulates specific institutions and agents—the ideological state apparatuses—to promote the beliefs and ideals of the ruling elite. These institutions ensure the participation of all individuals in a social order that benefits first and foremost the ruling class. Thus the educational system, religious institutions, and the cultural establishment are apparatuses operated by the state to generate the ruling ideology. As a result, a significant part of the system of shared beliefs and values constitutes a dominant ideology, and «ideology is thus destined, above all, to assure the domination of one class over the others, and the economic exploitation that maintains its preeminence, by making the exploited accept their condition as based on the will of God, nature, moral duty, etc.» (Althusser 1990:28). For Althusser there are no competing ideologies, only competition for control over the apparatuses. Competing ideologies, the ideological representations of nondominant social segments, will effectively translate into competitions for control of the ideological apparatuses, and ultimately for control of the state.

The most significant problem with this notion of ideology is that Althusser assumes a class reductionist conception of the operation and determination of both the state and the ideological system. The state is not run exclusively by the ruling class, nor is ideology generated exclusively by this class. The state can come into conflict with the ruling class, or a fraction thereof, and ideology can be generated by other social segments. The confrontation of alternative ideologies with the ruling ideology can generate contradictions that either precipitate social change, or by which these competing ideologies are absorbed, restructured, or ignored by the ruling elite.

Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980) have rejected the notion of a ruling ideology because they consider that the ideology can be effective only in integrating the dominant class. For the rest of society, a ruling ideology is rejected and avoided through ideologies of resistance. At any time, multiple competing ideologies should exist in a given society, and no single ideology is more effective than the others. These criticisms are echoed by McGuire, for whom the ruling «ideology may be accepted by subordinate classes, or they may rework it into an ideology of resistance. Conflict may result from the inconsistencies between the ideology of elites, and the ideology of subordinates, providing the conscious basis for resistance» (1992: 141–142). If ideology is accepted by dominated segments of society, it is because they are fooled into believing these misleading concepts.

Michael Mann, in a much less pessimistic view, argues against the notion of naive individuals easily fooled by the system (1986). He also argues that ideological systems are never crafted entirely by power-hungry elites with the sole objective of exploiting and bringing misery to the oppressed. For Mann, ideologies are accepted, not only because resistance may be too costly, but also because they offer a benefit: «People are not manipulated fools. And though ideologies always do contain legitimization of private interests and material domination, they are unlikely to attain a hold over people if they are merely this. Powerful ideologies are at least highly plausible in the conditions of the time, and they are genuinely adhered to» (1986:23).

The central problem with the critical conception of ideology is, therefore, that, in any given society, a set of competing ideologies exists. Unless we specify what conditions give primacy to one ideology over another, the use of ideology as a source of power is problematic. Recognizing the existence of competing ideologies is critical to understanding the nature of ideology as a tool for societal change. But recognizing the existence of multiple ideologies does not mean that all competing ideologies are equally effective.
The Materialization of Ideology

To become an effective source of social power, ideologies must have a form that can be effectively manipulated and controlled by a ruling elite. As we will argue, this requires that the ideology becomes materialized. Materialization is the transformation of ideas, values, stories, myths, and the like into a physical reality that can take the form of ceremonial events, symbolic objects, monuments, and writing systems.

Materialization of an ideology is essential in order to create common, shared experiences and to control the production and use of the ideology. To create common, shared experiences, it is necessary to manipulate ideas about appropriate values and norms. Cultures are inherently fragmented, representing the many voices that characterize differences of age, sex, occupation, locality, class, and individuality (Keesing 1985). If we think of culture as norms and values held in people's heads, it is difficult to understand how culture could be very broadly shared at all. Each human being, sculpted by personal experience, has an individualized reality. To even attempt to mold individual beliefs for social action, ideologies must be manifested in material forms that can be experienced in common by a targeted group. How the external world is organized and given meaning gives an important element of sharing to the cultural experience.

Essentially, we are arguing for the fundamental materiality of human culture. How shared values and norms could be held leads to a consideration of the essence of culture; it must be given a form in daily practice and material representation outside of the individual's mind. To be shared within an institutional setting, values and norms must be materialized. By using the term materialized (rather than materiality), we emphasize the continual process of creation and do not suppose the primacy of ideas. In fact the ideas and norms of culture and ideology are encapsulated in their practice and conditions of life as much as in people's heads.

To the degree that materialization is essential to the process of creating a shared political culture across historical divisions, the archaeologist holds an exceptionally advantageous position. Archaeologists, while ill-equipped to study specific thought processes requiring the daunting task of creating a «middle range theory» (MRT) of the mind (Cowgil 1993), can however study the explicit and vivid materialization of ideology used to create a common experience. We can study the investment itself (what was done with the available social capital) and the outcome of these decisions (the way in which the investment affected the stability and development of the overall society). Since the ideas and precepts of an ideological system must be made physical so as to be promulgated over a broad region and through time, the archaeologist comes into contact with the same transcultural materials created to mold the minds of peasants and subjugated populations.

To control the production and use of ideology, the ruling elite must monopolize access to it. An ideological system made up of elements freely available to every individual would lose its efficacy as an instrument of social action and social power. Ideology is an inherently weak source of social power because ideas themselves are impossible to control. Ideas are cheap and highly personal; nothing can prevent members of a group from generating their own ideas about the world and then attempting to convince others of their validity. Ideologies function equally as a means to assist and to resist authority. If ideologies are to be an effective source of power, then the production and transmission of ideas must be controlled. The ideas must somehow be owned, transferred, and inherited.

When ideas are materialized, the mechanisms of their production and transmission can indeed be controlled. In its material form, ideology can be experienced by a large group through public ceremonies, signified by status objects that are displayed and given, and owned through controlled access to the grounds and monuments on which the legitimization ceremonies are staged.

Through the process of materialization, an ideology takes on the characteristics of other manufactured things, while retaining its symbolic character. The tremendous costs of hosting ceremonial feasts, constructing monuments, or manufacturing the paraphernalia and costumes for events ground ideology in the
If ideology is seen as representation, ceremony, and material culture, we can understand how control over the economy and the labor force directly extends to control over ideology. An ideology rooted in a material medium can be controlled in much the same way that the manufacture of other utilitarian and wealth goods is owned, restricted, and transferred through the institutions of political economy.

**Means and Forms of Materialization**

In this section, we describe three means of materialization—ceremonial events, symbolic objects, and public monuments. Each has different characteristics in terms of the audience to whom it can be directed and the process by which its production can be controlled. The selection of one of these means therefore, has profound effects on the nature of the ideology and its effectiveness as a source of social power.

A given form may be more or less effective in accomplishing a particular objective: for example, ceremonies are events that integrate and define large groups, while prestige goods or symbolic objects are transportable and used to reward individuals and define their social status. Central to the Inka’s interpolity relationships were ceremonial events and feasts of enormous magnitude, and the exchange of prestigious objects, and even monuments. Monumental architecture is a means of communicating on a grand scale, so that central places arise not only to house the activities of a political life, but also to serve as the symbolic focus of a polity. The temple mounds of the Moche stand literally as the center of the polity. Symbolic objects and monuments are manufactured under the ruling elite’s direction, and distributed under their control. Such objects are owned by the rulers and inherited with political office.

Because the impact of each of these means is distinct, and because their production varies in terms of raw materials, gross labor, and the skills required, their application will vary in accordance with the elite’s particular capabilities and available resources. The overall development of a society’s economic infrastructure will directly affect the availability of resources that can be allocated to the materialization of ideology. As societies increase in complexity more resources will be made available, and more social inequalities will likely have to be legitimized by the ideological system.

By examining the forms of materialization, as well as the way resources are allocated to alternative sources of power within a political economy, we can begin to reconstruct the strategies through which ideologies were generated. For societies with a complex political economy, such as the Moche states or Inka empire, the different forms of materialization were often combined to accomplish the diverse goals of the state.

Because ideology must be materialized in objects and actions in order to be a source of social power, it is particularly relevant to the study of archaeology. Objects and actions, especially if repetitive and patterned, leave a mark in the archaeological record. The study of ideology in archaeology, therefore, has to be the study of how meaning, articulated in symbolic forms, is used to establish and maintain relations of domination (Thompson 1990:44).

**Ceremonial Events.** Events provide common, shared experiences to a group through participation in rituals, feasts, or performances. Ceremonial events are usually cyclical and repetitive actions, where participants perform the great mythical and ritual narratives of a society. Although examples of unstructured ceremonial events exist, most ceremonies are strictly prescribed in form, participation, and sequence (Geertz 1973). Ceremonial events are probably the most basic and simple form of materialized ideology, and have been with us since the beginning of human ideological behavior.

As material expressions of ideology, ceremonies, and ritual events can be manipulated and access to them can be restricted. The most basic restriction to the performance of a ritual event is its cost. Large-scale ritual events are costly, therefore the resources required to organize them usually surpass the resources that a single individual can expend for such activities. In hosting large-scale feasts, a leader or a ruling elite demonstrates the capacity to marshal quantities of food beyond the reach of others. Inka
feastings, or Moche ceremonial events are exceptional examples of the enormous cost involved in the organization of such activities, and of the capacity of ruling elites to stratify their participation and control their performance by prescribing ritual spaces and participants.

Another way of restricting access to the beneficial action of ceremonial events is to increase their organizational complexity, that is, the specialized nature and number of the component elements required for its performance. These components include the required participation of specific individuals—religious specialists—commonly associated with the ruling elites. The performance might also require specific skills, such as the execution of life-threatening acts that can only be accomplished by trained specialists. The congregation of a number of participants is usually an ingredient of ritual events, such that only the prestige and power of the state can pull together large numbers of individuals. Specific sacred spaces, either designated as such or artificially constructed, are also prescribed for the performance of ritual events. Finally, ritual paraphernalia are usually associated with the correct performance of a ritual event.

Ceremonies are usually repetitive and precisely timed. Much of their efficacy is attributed to their calendric nature, and to the need to reproduce them in the appropriate order. The beneficial effect of a ceremonial event is only transitory. Events are by definition enacted or performed, therefore they cannot be passed on to the succeeding generations, nor they can be owned. Only the right to perform the ceremony may be owned; once performed, it is over, and a new capital expenditure is required for its re-enactment. The internal organization of the ceremonial event usually relates to the need to create a narrative, and to reproduce reality by the action of the performers.

Ceremonial events can be efficient in the short-term, especially if they include dramatic performances combined with coercive elements, such as human sacrifice. But their efficacy in the long-run depends on the repetition of the event. Investments done in ceremonial events therefore, are not capital investments like the construction of a ceremonial place or the investment in the creation of ritual paraphernalia. Because of their immediacy, rituals are among the most valuable strategies for enculturation of individuals, such as newly conquered populations.

**Symbolic Objects and Icons.** Symbolic objects and icons, such as paraphernalia used for the performance of a ceremonial event, ritual attires, mural paintings, or icons depicted in any medium are some of the most efficacious forms of materialized ideology. The portable nature of most symbolic objects makes them strong candidates for symbolic communication among and within social segments and between political entities, and for personal display of status or affiliation with specific segments of society, whether determined by gender, age, function, or social position. On the other hand, icons of public display can communicate a standardized message to a large number of individuals simultaneously.

Portable objects are especially efficient for long-distance communication between political or cultural entities. In this context they can signify relation of dependency, affiliation, or correspondence. They can also be distributed within the segments of a society to create or reinforce vertical as well as horizontal relationships, and generate loyalties and consensus among individuals differentially benefiting from the social action. Ceremonial paraphernalia or status symbols can be paraded as part of ceremonial events, and because they can contain coded information they can serve as mechanisms for narrative representations. This narrative character, common in many complex iconographic systems and shared by the performance of ceremonial events, is one of the ruling elites’ most powerful tools to reinforce a message aimed at large masses of subordinated individuals.

Restricting access to the possession of symbolic objects can be achieved by controlling the production and distribution of such objects. This restriction can be achieved if access to the raw materials, technology, or skills required to produce them can also be restricted. In other words, the means of producing these kinds of objects must also be controlled by the ruling elites. Controlling the settings where these objects are more efficacious, or adding a special character to the object (e.g., by baptizing or blessing it), is another way to prevent their
indiscriminate use, specially if their production cannot be controlled. A round piece of metal is not a crown until it is consecrated in a coronation ceremony.

Symbolic objects, unlike events, can be owned, inherited, and transferred, making them ideal signifiers of social position and social relationships. Symbolic objects can accomplish their function even beyond death. But symbolic objects must be distinguished from common wealth objects, which can be exchanged only as determined by their commercial value. While symbolic objects do have commercial value, based on supply and demand, they require also additional special and predetermined conditions to become important objects of exchange.

Also in contrast with other forms of materialized ideology, symbolic objects can be of lower cost, and even very small in size. In these cases the material with which the objects were made (e.g., royal insignia), or the context of their production and use are unique (e.g., ancient Olympic laurel crowns). Objects crafted with great skill may be held in extreme value in their own cultural context, but in absolute terms may have «cost» only the food required by the craftsmen who produced them.

Public Monuments and Landscapes.
Public monuments and landscapes serve primarily, but not exclusively, ideological purposes. Some great buildings are constructed to serve as ceremonial facilities, others are centers of political power, and some are defensive structures. One factor common to all monuments, however, is their ability to be «experienced» simultaneously by large numbers of individuals. Impressive and even overwhelming, they can also be extremely effective in communicating simple messages. While their design might not have been particularly safe, they clearly convey a message of power and wealth (Trigger 1990). This elemental message comes across regardless of the viewer’s language, age, gender, or cultural affiliation.

The construction of monuments, such as pyramids or massive ceremonial mounds, and the rearrangements of the landscape, such as the construction of artificial hills or barrows requires enormous inputs of labor and resources. Enterprises of this magnitude are therefore restricted to the most powerful agents in a society; although fairly simple societies such as Southern England Neolithic chiefdoms (Earle 1991b), or Coastal Perú preceramic societies (Feldman 1987) created structures of impressive size. Because of its scale, monumental architecture is clearly one of the most remarkable expressions of the exercise of social power. The construction of these large buildings requires the cooperation of numerous individuals and the implementation of complex levels of labor force organization. Monuments are the result of regular taxation in the form of corvée labor, making them «works in progress.» In as much as there is a population to be taxed, the monuments will continue to grow in size or increase in number. This seems to be true of many Moche ceremonial centers (Hastings and Moseley 1975) constructed of multiple discrete sections apparently contributed by populations under the elite control.

Not only can monuments be shared simultaneously by numerous individuals, but, because of their impressive size, can usually be experienced from an extensive geographical area. These facilities are thus ideal for indoctrination, population control, and dissemination of propaganda. Moreover, within or around monuments large numbers of individuals can congregate to participate in ritual events.

Among the elites, monuments are subject to ownership, transference, and inheritance, thereby becoming capital investments of long-term reliability. Unlike events, which must be repeated on a regular basis, monuments remain permanent representations of the ideological system—permanent witnesses to the power of the dominant classes. Monuments often effectively represent power, even long after a state or social system has disappeared, therefore defying time, and giving the impression of permanence and transcendence.

Monuments usually form the setting within which ceremonial events take place and where portable objects acquire a symbolic status; they can therefore legitimize other aspects of the ideological system. By prescribing performances to public monuments, as much as by controlling the ceremonial paraphernalia used in these performances, ruling elites can restrict access to ceremonial events. Ritual burials of elite individuals take place in this
setting, as in the Danish (Bech and Olsen 1985) and Moche cases (Donnan and Castillo 1992). In this way the ruling segments of society not only legitimize their control of ceremonial spaces in life, they seemingly extend their influence to the other world. Ownership of this powerful means of social control is therefore sanctioned by generations and ascribed to individuals that can claim consanguinity with the interred ancestors.

Monuments, as well as any constructions or markings of the landscape, accomplish the task of domesticating unused territories and of symbolizing the appropriation of space. Marked territories can be claimed, owned, and inherited, while unmarked territories are wild and unclaimed. This power of monuments can be seen in the numerous barrows and artificial mounds of Denmark, and in walls and alignments, geoglyphs and marks, roads and paths that cross the Peruvian deserts. These structures, if nothing else, stand as monuments to their builders.

Monuments not only delineate ownership of space, they also explicitly define vertical relations within society. Space has to be organized in accordance with the ways in which society is organized and stratified because this organization often parallels the way in which the monument is used. In complex societies, public architecture and ceremonial facilities appear in capitals and ceremonial centers before other settlements within the polity have these types of structures, thereby reflecting the power of the central hierarchy and its monopolization of civic-ceremonial activity. The distribution of monuments in a landscape, therefore, can often serve as a roadmap of the sociopolitical system.

Writing Systems. Writing, the fourth form of materialized ideology, has some particularities of its own and some characteristics in common with other forms of materialized ideology. Written documents, such as inscribed stelae or monuments, legal documents, contracts, and policies are physical manifestations of belief systems and, like other forms of ideology, can tell a story or transmit a message. While the other ideological media accomplish this task indirectly, texts can be explicit and direct; therefore, they can be used to state an unambiguous message. But this is not always necessarily the case, nor is the information coded in written texts explicit for everybody. Reading does not always mean understanding, and even when understood, written words are not necessarily truth. Writing is stating a point of view, an interpretation of reality, not a statement of reality itself. Writing, therefore, can be the most deceiving form of materialized ideology.

In terms of transmitting messages and information, written documents duplicate the effects of other media such as oral accountings, songs, and prayers. The intrinsic difference of a written document lies in its intransitive nature. Written words are here to stay, especially when they are «written in stone.» But often what is «written in stone» are not facts or customs that are generally known and accepted. There would simply be no reason to incur such costs. Rather, elites are more likely to sponsor the inscription of propaganda on the highly and permanent record of stone monuments.

As physical objects, written documents are bounded and controlled through the same productive processes as other material things. The technology to produce and circulate in society the raw materials of writing, such as inks, paper, and bark, can be controlled in much the same way as the materials required to produce symbolic objects. Access to written documents can be even more tightly restricted through control of the extremely specialized technologies of writing and reading. Writing can create a clearly specialized section of society, a real class of «craft» specialist. These craftsmen, because of the intrinsic qualities of their trade, were frequently ascribed privileged positions in society, unequal to that of other professionals.

Case Studies

Three cases have been chosen for analysis in this paper: Thy, Denmark; the Moche of Peru; and the Andean Inka. We have chosen these archaeological cases pragmatically; we are conducting ongoing research with them. Such firsthand knowledge informs us on the complexity and dynamism involved in the search for political power. In each situation leaders sought to establish and maintain political control over broad populations.
Although political success differed, the quest for power was a common process; ideology was an important source for that political power, and became effective as it was materialized through different media. In each case we review the specific media used for materialization ceremonial events, symbolic objects, and public monuments.

These cases represent an evolutionary spectrum from emergent chiefdoms to massive empires. To some measure, the variability observed in the materialization of ideology reflects differences in social complexity, the scale and institutional setting of power relationships. One may conclude that with the evolution of human society, the means by which ideology serves political goals are transformed. The arrangement of the cases illustrates this dimension of the variability. Chiefdoms, as illustrated by the Danish case, are fundamentally fragile political formations; they fragment almost as quickly as they form. Ideology is only weakly controlled by the chiefs who sponsor small scale ceremonies, exchange and possess simple symbols of position, and construct modest monuments to their immortality. States, as illustrated by the Moche, are institutionally elaborated and more stable. They can take on the character of the theater in which social order is played out through elaborate ceremonies and dramatic symbols of order and relationship. Complicated historical narratives that legitimize that order are rehearsed through continual practice. The expansionist empire, as illustrated by the Inka case, may simplify its ideology into critical elements that are «transportable» across cultural boundaries. Elements of military power, monumentality, and massive ceremonialism are especially appropriate.

Considerable variation exists among the cases, and much more broadly variability results from historical conditions of culture, institutional structure, and political economy. Given the scope of the present paper, an assumption must be made that diverse lines of development in politics and ideology exist and must be studied more fully in further investigations. Similarly, we have not considered egalitarian societies, in which social dynamics involving ritual and ceremonialism included materialized ideology to define group identity, inter group relationships, and social power (Spielman 1992).

1. The Evolution of Chiefdoms: Neolithic and Bronze Ages of Thy, Denmark

From the Early Neolithic into the Bronze Age, the prehistory of northern and western Europe witnessed cycles of chiefly evolution and decline. The megalithic monuments and imposing barrow cemeteries testify to central leadership and social ranking. Europe has become an important case for understanding the evolutionary dynamics of chiefdoms (Bradley 1984, 1991; Earle 1991a; Kristiansen 1984, 1987, 1991; Randsborg 1974; Renfrew 1972, 1974). In some essential characteristics, however, the chiefdoms of prehistoric Europe must be considered failed attempts at consolidating and extending political domination, moving beyond the scale of Bigman polities.

Despite evident attempts to centralize and institutionalize power, the emergent chiefdoms remained limited in scope and stability. Distinguished chiefs might emerge briefly in some regions, such as Wessex or Thy, only to lose power and be eclipsed temporarily by another regional development. The work presently being conducted by the Thy Archaeological Project in Denmark (Bech 1993) seeks to investigate the power strategies of chiefly elites under adverse conditions. The Danish case exemplifies chiefdoms in which the ownership of productive resources was an ineffective source of social power. The extensive agricultural lands without developed facilities, like irrigation systems or drainage projects, could not be effectively owned or inherited. Warfare, as a potent source of coercive power, was problematic, because of the limited control over the means of destruction.

In this section we review how the chiefs of Thy developed a hierarchical ideology. Transforming an Early Neolithic ideology that emphasized group identity, attention came to focus on male warriors as distinctive and dominant. The effectiveness of the hierarchical, warrior ideology as a source of political power
ultimately depended on its materialization in ways that could be effectively controlled. The critical step appears to have been the introduction of metal production of special chiefly swords that defined political office. The construction in the landscape of the chiefly burial monuments may have been especially important to institutionalize power relationships in lineages with inherited offices.

Located on the extreme northwest of Jutland, Thy is a low and narrow land bordered on the west by the North Sea and on the east by the Limfjord. The landscape is rolling with low hills and small streams, lakes, and bogs, the terrain derives from terminal moraine. Soils are fertile, but agricultural productivity is limited by the northern winters and by summer droughts. In the Early Neolithic, farming populations moved into Thy and the original forests were modified by shifting cultivation. About 2600 B.C. the forests were rapidly cleared away and by 2000 B.C. the landscape was open grasslands presumably used for pasture (Andersen 1993).

The culture history of Thy dramatically illustrates the patterns of chiefly expansion and collapse. Early farmers in the Neolithic from the Funnel Beaker Culture had a low-density population. A few megalithic monuments cluster in several localities, and one causewayed enclosure has been excavated. Some leadership can be inferred from the monumental construction, perhaps equivalent to a Big Men Collectivity (Johnson and Earle 1987).

About 2600 B.C., a rapid and profound economic and political change began with the Single Grave Culture. As the forests were rapidly removed, pastoralism became increasingly important. Low barrow groups, marking the graves of single men with battle axes or women with elaborate amber necklaces, demonstrate some ranking. Later in the Neolithic, long-distance cultural ties were established between northern Jutland and western regions of Bell Beaker settlements (Jensen 1982; Vandkilde 1991). The work in Thy has uncovered several Bell Beaker settlements consisting of clusters of hamlet-size sites, each with a few houses. Ranking was not elaborated, but the distinctive material culture must have distinguished personal status.

During the Early Bronze Age the landscape became crowded with thousands of barrows, some standing over 10 m high, and rich burials with fine chiefly swords in the Nordic style. During this period, the status of chiefly elites was marked by beautifully crafted swords, distinct from the working swords of associated warriors (Kristiansen 1984). Following a brief fluorescence during Periods 2/3, the society of Thy again became less distinctive within the broader Danish patterns.

Ceremonial Events. Friedman and Rowlands (1978) argue that chiefly status in Europe derived primarily from hosting feasts and social exchanges of prestige goods. Chiefs centralized and extended the kinship system and its structured obligations through multiple, regional marriages that established and reinforced regional alliance networks. By hosting elaborated feasts, leaders established their prestige and attracted marriage and exchange partners that further allowed them to control the exchange of prestige goods, moving long distances across Europe. In a pattern familiar from the Moka of New Guinea (Strathern 1971), success would have translated directly into prestige both for the individual leader and his social group.

Although indirect and variable in character, the archaeological evidence for ceremonial events is quite strong. During the Early Neolithic, across Denmark and elsewhere in Europe, ‘causewayed enclosures’ were constructed to stage elaborate ceremonial occasions. Spaced fairly regularly through the landscape (Madsen 1988), these monuments were positioned on topographically prominent locations. Chains of pits were excavated, and the earth thrown up to build an earthen bank that enclosed a sacred or political space. Special deposits of animal bone and ceramics are found in the pits filled up as single events. Human skeletal material, such as lines of skulls, document death rituals at the site. In Denmark at least, these enclosures existed for only a brief period around 3000 B.C.

More continuous, but also episodic, were the construction of burial monuments associated with rites of passage and succession of leadership. The monuments themselves are discussed later, but the association with ceremonial occasions are relevant here. During the Early Neolithic, the megalithic tombs were
constructed as homes for the dead that could be re-opened easily for additional burials and cyclical rituals of the community (Hodder 1990). In front of the chamber, large and elaborated ceramic pieces document ceremonial events (Tilley 1984). The barrows of the later Neolithic and Early Bronze Ages continue the monumentality associated with the rituals of death, but the symbolic significance of the burial ritual and associated monuments evidently changed (Bradley 1984). The individual, central burial became the focus of the ritual interment and apparently indicates special status, perhaps of chiefs. These ceremonies would have been critical to the success and the succession of leadership.

Further evidence for the importance of ceremonial events is the use of Bell Beaker ceramics. These ceramics were of special forms, including large and small containers that are interpreted as drinking vessels. They are stylistically elaborate with detailed geometric incised lines filled with brilliant pigments. A likely use of these vessels would have been for copious consumption of alcohol at ceremonial occasions. The Bell Beaker phenomenon thus may indicate the development of linked ceremonial events in a peer polity interaction sphere. Such events would have been both the platform for status rivalry and the arena to establish regional identities of leaders as set apart ideologically from local affiliations.

Control over such ceremonial events would, however, have been difficult to monopolize or extend, as is evident in the Moka ceremonies of New Guinea (Strathern 1971). Such events would have given little opportunity to enlarge relationships or to pass on achieved prestige. The fact that ceremonial occasions are best documented for the Early Neolithic, when ranking was not elaborated, suggests that ceremonial events may have emphasized group identity and would have had only limited use alone as a basis of political authority.

**Symbolic Objects of War and Wealth.** The basis of power in Thy derived from control over the production and distribution of symbolic objects and the ideology that they materialized (Earle 1991b). Different types of symbolic objects were used at different periods, and the different character of their production and articulation to subsistence should have fundamentally affected societal scale and stability. The first contrast is between weaponry and jewelry (Kristiansen 1984, 1991). Both symbolize social distinction, but the finely crafted swords served as symbols and instruments of naked force. The second contrast is between objects locally available and simply manufacture versus those requiring foreign materials and complicated fabrication. These source of ideological power have different potentials and problems for the emerging leaders of northern Denmark.

The prestige goods that characterized the Neolithic and Bronze Age societies of Thy include items of personal decoration, ritual/ceremonial use, and war. Personal decorative objects were amber pendants and beads and bronze broaches, arm rings, belt pieces and the like. Ritual and ceremonial objects included elaborate decorated ceramics and flint axes. Weapons of war include stone battle axes, flint daggers and arrow points, and bronze swords and daggers.

During the Funnel Beaker period, symbolic objects that would have served at ceremonies include elaborately decorated ceramics and hordes of axes used to clear forests. The ceramics are found in the ritual settings at the openings of megalithic tombs where feasting and offerings at death rituals probably occurred. The ax hordes are found at supposed sacred wet locations (bogs, streams, springs) where agricultural ritual probably took place. Elaborate amber necklace pieces were found in the megalithic monuments of Thy, but because the individual interments were mixed, it is now impossible to identify the grave goods with individuals. These objects, made of the locally available amber, would have been used for personal decoration, but the mixing after death would seem to emphasize groups individual identity.

The use of symbolic objects changes in the Single Grave and Bell Beaker contexts to an emphasis on individuals and warfare. Single Grave men’s graves were typically marked by a stone battle ax (or sometimes only flint blades); women’s graves include amber necklaces, occasionally with many hundred small beads (Bech and Olsen 1985). While female status may still be marked by items of personal decoration, male objects identify them
as warriors. Bell Beaker graves are rare for Thy, but elsewhere they contain beautifully crafted flint daggers. These daggers, manufactured in Thy from locally mined flint, are long and carefully manufactured with grinding and a finishing flaking pattern that created beautiful objects. The high level of craftsmanship in the finishing flaking would have restricted the numbers of knappers able to produce a highest quality piece, but lower quality, simply-flaked daggers were also made. Daggers were items to display warrior status, but the broad availability of them would have made it difficult to control their use. In the Thy Archaeological Project (TAP) settlement excavations, flint daggers were routinely recovered from household excavations and must have been significant in everyday life. At the same time, the use of amber for personal display declined markedly, probably tied to its export to southern Europe (Shennan 1982). At Thy 2758, amber manufacture can be postulated based on raw amber, amber dust found in flotation samples, and micro-drills; no finished beads, however, were found. The important point is that symbolic objects continued to be manufactured of local materials, but that the dominant symbolic reference changed to emphasize male military power.

In the Early Bronze Age, the nature of symbolic objects changes dramatically again. Objects of local manufacture all but cease to be used to define status. In TAP excavations, ceramics became simplified with only minimal decorative elaboration. No flint daggers or arrowheads were found. Amber, although found on all sites, was always in raw form most probably being collected for export. The symbolic objects were now almost exclusively of bronze, made from tin and copper, neither of which were available in Denmark. Most dramatic were the elaborately decorated chiefly swords (Fig. 1). More than 100 swords and daggers from these barrows in Thy have been recovered, and their styles correspond to broadly shared patterns of manufacture and decoration that spread through Denmark and Germany. Most were probably locally manufactured, but the complicated steps of their manufacture, including lost wax molding and elaborate working, document a sophisticated production process (Kristiansen 1987).

Decorative brooches, found in graves and assumed to be female decoration, were also frequently used to define status in Thy burials. In contrast to the swords, these items require quite simple fabrication and may have been manufactured by annealing of traded wire or bars; brooch fragments from Thy 2999 may well indicate the local fabrication of the brooches in this residence where no evidence of elite association is evident.

The use of symbolic objects in Denmark changed quite dramatically during the time period under consideration. While female status may have continued to signal personal decoration/attractiveness, male status came to refer to weapons of destruction. Initially these items, especially the flint daggers, were copies of southern metal daggers produced locally from available flint. The quality of the manufacturing process permitted some control over the availability of these symbolic means of coercion, but this control would have been comparatively weak. It was the introduction of bronze metal working with the sophisticated manufacturing needed specifically for the swords that gave the economic control needed to permit the expansion of political centralization seen dramatically in the Early Bronze Age. Kristiansen (1984, 1987, 1991) argues that, during the Danish Bronze Age, chiefs controlled long-distance procurement of metal through chiefly exchange partnerships and alliances. The local manufacture of wealth could be controlled by supporting artisans attached to elite patrons. Through this control over metal and its fabrication, the chiefs retained exclusive access to weapons, to the symbols of military might, and to an ideology of warrior domination.

Public Monuments. Public monuments were essential elements of the materialization of ideology, but the nature of these materializations changed dramatically through the Neolithic and Early Bronze Ages. The construction of the monuments in Denmark and elsewhere in Europe appears to have been relatively small scale and episodic. Short periods of construction were followed by long periods of little building on a specific monument, within a local area, and within a region. Spurts of building punctuated by long periods of inaction suggest the cyclical nature
of local polities, rising to local prominence and then rapidly declining (Bradley 1984).

Beyond this, the symbolic character of the monuments seems to change quite dramatically. During the first half of the Neolithic, associated with the Funnel Beaker Culture, the monuments of Thy comprise both the megalithic burial monuments and causewayed enclosures. The megalithic monuments involved the selection of some very large boulders, weighing upwards of 20 tons, their transportation to the construction site, and their near miraculous placement as upright walls and roofing of a central burial chamber. Most impressive were the passage graves, represented in Thy by the impressive monument of Lundhøj. Here a central chamber was constructed of boulders chinked by careful stonework and a clay cap to make the room fully waterproof. Hansen (1993) argues that the stone work of these monuments was the result of tested, sophisticated engineering. The architects may well have been specialists working for a number of patrons/ groups in a large region.

The labor involved in the construction of a passage grave was certainly considerable; estimates for England range upwards of 15,000 man days (Startin 1982), and the direction of local leaders in their construction seems evident. But the symbolic referent seems equally clearly to have been the larger corporate group and not the leader. The monuments were used repeatedly for multiple burials, with individual skeletons being intermixed. These were houses for the ancestors of a group and apparently defined the corporate character of the group, as distinct from any specific group leader.

The causewayed enclosures in Denmark suggest a higher level of social integration than the megaliths. The enclosure ditches and embankments were quite extensive, defining areas up to 20 ha. Within the territory of a single causewayed enclosure, multiple megalithic monuments existed (Earle 1991b; Madsen 1988). Bradley (1984) argues that the chains of pits that characterize these enclosures documents the division of labor into separate work crews, perhaps indicating the spatial division of the area into separate polities or social segments.

During the Middle Neolithic, burial rituals and associated monument constructions changed dramatically. In Thy, Single Grave monuments, with one or two central interments, were low mounds, within which a central plank coffin was covered with turf cut from the surrounding pasture grasslands. The amount of labor and monumental character of the mounds were less notable than the earlier megalithic monuments, but the symbolic reference clearly shifted to define the status of an individual, presumably of special status or a least attempting to represent distinctiveness. Symbolically the early definition of the group is replaced by individuality.

During the Early Bronze Age, construction of the famous barrows of Thy transformed the landscape. The hilltops became dotted with clusters of burial mounds. A central interment was marked by a cist of glacial boulders, sometimes of considerable size. Then the mound was built-up with turf and edged with a curb of glacial boulders. Typically only one central burial was laid out before being covered by the barrows; it was common for the monument then to be used for additional burials. Several of the monuments that we excavated in Thy showed major rebuilding, with a second construction phase that added an outer curb and raised the monument’s height. Most markedly, the sizes of all the monuments were not the same. Some barrows, such as the distinctive mound of Bavnehøj in Sønderhå parish, Thy, were over 3 m high and 30 m in diameter. Clustered around this monument were lesser mounds, usually less than 1 m high. The evident distinction is that some monuments required significantly more labor in their manufacture and most probably indicate a paramount chief. The Early Bronze Age barrows must have stood in the landscape as the materialization of the social hierarchy and the religious sanctity by which it was legitimized. The landscape was transformed from an open rolling grassland in the Middle Neolithic, to a landscape marked by the monuments of the dead chiefs. The dead had been planted in the soil and their places of interment remain marked to the present day. This socially transformed landscape was no longer a natural world; it was a world owned and controlled by the chiefs whose right to leadership was rooted in their living dead ancestors (Earle 1991a).
The chiefdoms of Thy represent weakly centralized polities. The ideology of leadership was grounded in ceremonial events, symbolic objects, and burial monuments each in different ways demonstrating the distinctiveness and sanctity of leaders. Importantly the symbolic character of the societies was significant in all periods. Early on, leadership is suggested by group corporate monuments; later, individual distinctiveness is represented by monuments and symbolic objects. This transformation from group to individual focus in the symbolic reference has been described as two different types of chiefdoms (Renfrew 1974). The reason for the shift seems to have been largely historical, associated perhaps with an increase emphasis on pastoralism which would have permitted a more centralized control over production through the ownership of the herds and control of their use in ritual feasting and the export of the special products over broad regions (Sherratt 1981). The real centralization of power seems, however, to depend on the development of an ideology of warrior elite identified closely with their metal weaponry. A warrior would have been identified by his weapon. The prestige goods exchange involved the controlled importation and fabrication of these symbols of power and distinctiveness. The ritual burial of the chiefs in the barrows then created the symbolic landscape with its evident definition of sanctity and ownership on which the chiefdoms attempted to institutionalize power through its long-term materialization.

2.- The Transition from Chiefdoms to State Level Societies: The Moche Case

Some of the best examples of the effects of materialized ideology in an emerging state level society can be found among the Moche of northern Peru. The Moche have been the subject, in the last few years, of numerous research projects. The data presented here is based primarily on the results of the San José de Moro Archaeological Project, co-directed by Christopher B. Donnan and Luis Jaime Castillo.

At around A.D. 100, in the fertile coastal valleys of the northern Peruvian desert, the Moche began to evolve from the fairly simple Cupisnique and Salinar chiefdoms to become, by around A.D. 400, some of the first state-level societies in the Andes. Moche society was clearly stratified into distinct social segments as expressed in differential burial practices (Castillo and Donnan 1994, Donnan 1991), and settlement patterns. Not only do we find sites of different function and size (Willey 1953; Wilson 1988) but within the sites we can identify socially differentiated areas or neighborhoods (Bawden 1977, 1982). Production diversification and crafts specialization, long distance exchange and construction of large scale irrigation infrastructure are some of the most distinct economical achievements of the Moche.

Traditionally the Moche have been considered as one single and unified political entity (Larco 1945). This assumption of a single state society was based on the apparent similarities in art styles and ceramic forms. The evidence available at present seems to indicate that the Moche were organized into at least two independent polities (Donnan 1990), one centered in the southern valleys of Moche and Chicama, and the other sharing centers in the Jequetepeque and Lambayeque valley systems (Castillo and Donnan 1994).

A remarkable aspect of the cultural history of the Moche is that these two distinct polities exhibit different developmental sequences, with one polity achieving higher levels of complexity than the other. While the northern Moche polities remained independent regional states, never expanding beyond their traditional limits, by about A.D. 400 the southern Moche developed an expansive territorial state that conquered and controlled valleys to the south of their original territory. Nevertheless, the similarities reflected in some important aspects of the material culture of both northern and southern Moche indicates that, in spite of political differences, they were part of the same cultural phenomenon. This cultural similarity is evident in funerary practices, in complicated ceremonies and mythologies as depicted in murals and painted ceramics, and in the paraphernalia associated with these ceremonies.
Throughout their history Moche elites apparently developed a peculiar power strategy that relied heavily on ideology and religious performances. Power was created and maintained through an unequal and socially stratified access to and possession of symbolic objects and participation in ceremonial activities. The development of a complex system of religious ceremonies—enacted by Moche elite individuals—and the investment of social wealth in the creation of symbolic objects seems to relate to two strategies aimed at increasing elite’s power. The first strategy was directed toward increasing social solidarity and hence involving all levels of society in the state endeavors. This was accomplished by means of a system of rituals and ceremonies shared by all Moche, that created a common ground of symbolic communication within the ranks of the elites and between them and the lower levels of society. In the ceremonial system the social order was reflected by a stratified participation, in which every segment of society was ascribed the enactment and personification of an equivalent position in the pantheon of deities and supernatural entities. In this way only individuals of the high elite could enact the leading roles and therefore legitimize their privileged position in society. By performing these ceremonial activities the Moche recreated their myths and traditions and effectively materialized narratives that in essence where the representation of their past. In this way Moche elites could appropriate and own history and tradition.

The second strategy was to increase interdependencies and communication among the ranks of the elites, decreasing the tendencies towards dispersion or cultural drift of elite individuals disconnected from the core of Moche society. Moche’s high elite accomplished this by means of tightly controlling the production of symbolic objects—the access to them—and their manipulation via their distribution among lower levels of their own social segment. This strategy took two forms: a vertical communication between the ranks of the elites, that implied the redistribution of ritual objects; and a horizontal communication among the upper ends of the elites by exchanging the most elaborated symbolic and exotic objects. This strategy eventually generated a pan-Moche elite ideology (Castillo 1994).

Ceremonial Events. One of the most remarkable aspects of Moche society is that it shows evidences of complex social stratification beginning with its early stages. Burial ceremonies were evidently instrumental in defining the social structure and its supporting ideology, therefore it is in burial practices where organizational aspects of Moche society are best expressed. Moche burials show an enormous variability in their forms, the amount of labor invested in their construction and preparation of the bodies, and especially in the number and type of objects that accompany the deceased. More than 300 Moche burials have been excavated archaeologically (Donnan 1991); the picture that emerges from the study of these burials is rather astonishing.

Differences in funerary treatment between social segments are usually qualitative; different status groups had access to different types and qualities of symbolic objects. High status burials frequently contain gold and silver objects, fine ceramics, imported materials such as spondylus shells, and precious stones such as lapis lazuli and turquoise (Alva and Donnan 1993; Donnan and Castillo 1992). Middle status burials contain a few metal and ceramic objects, but not of the quality found in high status burials (Donnan and Mackey 1978). In low status burials almost no associations are found (Donnan 1991). In addition to these qualitative inequalities, some differences can be found within a given social segment expressed basically by quantitative differences. In other words, within a social segments individuals are getting more or less of the same type of objects. But social inequalities are not restricted to burial ascription. Household sizes and arrangement, and quality of the materials used in their constructions are clearly stratified along the same lines as burials. Furthermore, settlement organization demonstrates that social status implied also a differential access to ceremonial spaces (Bawden 1977, 1982; Haas 1985).

Moche elites’ preferential access to and manipulation of the ceremonial system is clearly one of the most important components of their power strategy. Until recently we could not ascertain whether the relationships between
this social segment and the ceremonial system were restricted to the ascription, for funerary purposes, of objects in which the ceremonial and mythical systems were represented. The only available clue was contained in the vivid representations that characterize Moche iconography. Moche iconography depicts a number of ceremonial events, such as ritual deer hunts, dances or combats, where the participants seem to be members of this society’s elite, and where lower social level individuals only figure as service-providers (Donnan 1978). Ample archaeological evidence exists to support that elite members of Moche society were participating in these ceremonial events (Castillo 1991; Donnan and Castillo 1992; Donnan and Mackey 1978). But these events were clearly second in importance to more complex ceremonies where deities and supernatural individuals have the central roles (Castillo 1989).

Among the Moche ritual events the Sacrifice Ceremony (Fig. 2) was evidently the most complex ceremonial event in the Moche liturgy (Alva and Donnan 1993; Donnan 1975). In the Sacrifice Ceremony, defeated warriors are sacrificed by anthropomorphized animals and animated objects, that cut open the prisoners throats, pouring the blood into tall ceremonial goblets (Fig. 2, bottom). The blood-full goblets are then transferred to several mythical figures, usually Figure B (a bird-like individual) and Figure C (a female), who present them to two or the most important Moche deities, Figures A and D, who promptly consume the blood (Fig. 2, top). The archaeological data shows that the Sacrifice Ceremony was practiced throughout 450 years of Moche history (Alva and Donnan 1993). Evidence of this ceremony has been found, either in iconographic representations or in ritual paraphernalia associated with elite burials, in every region under control of Moche polities (Alva and Donnan 1993; Bonavia 1959, 1985; Donnan and Castillo 1992, 1994; Strong and Evans 1952; Ubbelohde-Doering 1983). The Sacrifice Ceremony can be considered a pan-Moche ceremonial event, crosscutting political entities and giving consistency to the Moche cultural phenomenon.

Recent research on Moche funerary practices shows that the relationship between the elites and the ceremonial system was even closer than we expected. Findings in elite burials of ritual paraphernalia associated with the Sacrifice Ceremony, such as the goblet that contained the blood of the prisoners (Donnan and Castillo 1992:40), figure’s A scepter (Alva and Donnan 1993:97-101), and clothing elements associated with Figures A, B and C, demonstrate that some elite individuals personified, probably throughout their lives and certainly at the time of their death, the most important deities and priests in this ceremony. These symbolic objects are key to the performance of mythical events recreated by living member of the Moche elites.

Based on the funerary associations found in one of the tombs at Sipan, in the Lambayeque valley, Alva and Donnan (1993) suggest that the Lord of Sipan fulfilled in life the ceremonial roles of Figure A. Figure A is depicted in the Sacrifice Ceremony receiving the goblet full of human blood (Fig. 2). Also at Sipán the authors have been able to recognize another deity featured in the same ceremony, this time Figure B, an individual wearing a large bird-like headpiece, that presents the goblet to Figure A (Alva and Donnan 1993:143-161). At the site of San José de Moro, in the Jequetepeque valley, Donnan and Castillo (1992) have located two elaborate tombs of females containing examples of the goblet used in the Sacrifice Ceremony (Castillo and Donnan 1994). These females were buried with the headdress of yet another deity that took part in the Sacrifice Ceremony, Figure C, a female who presents to Figures A and B the goblet full of human blood (Donnan and Castillo 1992:41). Finding the goblet and headdress together in two roughly contemporaneous funerary contexts confirms that elite individuals were personifying the most important deities of the Moche pantheon, and that these roles were passed from one individual to the other.

An individual’s position in society not only implied a preferential or detrimental access to and possession of resources and goods, but also differential participation in the political and ceremonial realms of Moche life. This unequal access to the material expressions of the ideological system signals the position of the individual and allows us to understand how important it was for Moche elites to keep a tight
control over this system. Control was especially exercised over material expressions of the ideology that signaled the position of the individual in society and legitimized right to power, therefore determining a person’s social identity and rights and obligations.

We find among the Moche social segments represented by differential access to qualitatively unequal funerary goods. This translates into a stratified access to the ceremonial system and its artifactual representations, expressed, in turn, by qualitative differences in symbolic objects in burials of different social levels. In burials of the highest status, such as those of the Lords of Sipán or the elite females of San José de Moro, we find the actual paraphernalia and ritual attire worn during the most important rituals, such as the Sacrifice Ceremony (Alva and Donnan 1993; Donnan and Castillo 1992). In burial of members of the immediately inferior social level, for example lower elite individuals in Pacatnamú (Ubbelohde-Doering 1983), we find artifacts such as carved gourds and ceramic vessels with detailed fine-line or three-dimensional representations of the ceremonial events, but not the actual paraphernalia required to perform them. In the middle levels of society we find only representations of parts or elements of the ritual events; that is the case of some burials of infants at San José de Moro (Donnan and Castillo n.d.). Finally, at the lowest levels of Moche society almost no objects associated with the symbolic system can be verified (Donnan 1991). This differential access to the ceremonial system or its representations mark vertical relations in Moche society. Differentiation of status or gradation within social segments, especially among members of the elite where we see a much clearer resolution, are marked by the number of symbolic objects, especially ceramic and metal pieces ascribed to a burial.

**Symbolic Objects.** Another way in which the materialization of ideology was used to create and maintain the social fabric of Moche society was in the differential distribution of ritual or symbolic objects among the ranks of the elites. This distribution reflects a deliberate strategy that implied control over the production and distribution of such objects. Tight control over the production of symbolic objects restricts in access to them, while their centralized and unequal distribution is one of the ways of manipulating this particular expression of ideology.

Elite Moche funerary contexts show a preferential and sometimes restricted access to certain symbolic objects and raw materials, especially fine ceramics. Moche fine ceramics were frequently decorated with complex iconography, often narrative (Castillo 1991) and extremely detailed, such as the representations of the Sacrifice Ceremony discussed above (Fig. 2). Since only elite burials contain these objects, they can be interpreted as being socially restricted, as can the information coded in the iconographic representations they depict. We have seen both in the Danish and Moche cases how restricted ideological information, materialized in symbolic objects such as iconographic ceramics, not only marks the status of the individual in death, but was used as means to exercise power in society. We can assume that this differential distribution is the result of a deliberate policy aimed at preventing large sections of Moche society access to these objects. These objects also tend to be the product of specialized labor, and in their manufacture Moche artists made use of exotic raw materials, such as pigments, clays, and Spondylus shells imported from Ecuador, or lapis lazuli and turquoise stones imported from Chile and Argentina.

A hypothetical scenario for the production and distribution of ceremonial ceramics in Moche can be postulated from studies of ceramic production centers (Russell, Leonard, and Briceño 1994). Based on the distribution of identifiable ceramic styles it is quite apparent that fine ceramics seems to have been manufactured in every Moche region, probably with more than one ceramic production center within a region at every point in time. It is fairly clear that ceramic production was divided on the basis of the target populations, and the quality of the products needed to supply these populations. In this way the production of symbolic objects become firmly imbedded in the economic process. A few middle-range ceramic production centers have been located, and lower range production areas, in charge of simple domestic wares are known from many areas (Russell, Leonard, and Briceño 1994).
Unfortunately fine ceramics production centers have yet to be located; however based on their distribution, we can assume that the high elites kept the production of fine ceramic wares under their control, keeping for themselves the more elaborated pieces, and restricted their access by other segments of society. In turn, the high elite distributed the remaining production of fine wares among the local lower ranks of the elite. There is also some evidence to show that the rulers of different regions and polities were exchanging some of their finest ritual objects (Glenn Russell, personal communication 1992). These mechanisms of production and distribution are clear examples of restricted access to the material expressions of ideology. They are also good examples of the manipulation of these types of objects since this redistribution served to create and maintain loyalties among the elite ranks, generated a dependency of the lower ranks, and legitimated the power of whomever controlled their production and distribution. Exchanges among the higher ranks of the elites probably contributed to the affirmation of a shared identity, reinforcing political links and certainly preventing or at least slowing cultural drift.

Symbolic objects were, therefore, a means of communication between elites from different regions and polities and also served to integrate different ranks of the elite within a particular region or polity. The lowest levels of society, the peasantry, although knowledgeable of the rituals enacted in ceremonial places, of orally transmitted narratives, and of public renditions of iconography, such as mural paintings, had no access to the symbolic objects.

Current research at the northern Moche site of San José de Moro (Castillo 1994, Castillo and Donnan 1994; Donnan and Castillo 1992, 1994, n.d.) allows us to test this hypothetical system of production and distribution of symbolic objects. By around A.D. 650 we can see a significant change in the original source of supply of some Moche fine ceramics: For the first time we find evidence of imported ritual objects, sometimes coming from the central coast valleys of Lima and Lurín, as far as 700 km south. These objects, some of the finest produced in their home societies, appear only in the most complex burials and no sign of them is found in domestic settings. This distribution pattern implies that the highest ends of the Late Moche elite controlled the long-distance exchange networks, thereby monopolizing the importation of ritual objects that represented interactions with the then-flourishing central coast societies. This exchange of fine ideological artifacts was important for a society in decline as was the Late Moche, particularly because Moche elites had traditionally based a great part of their power on the manipulation of materialized ideology.

The introduction of foreign symbolic objects must have severely impacted the social relationships among Moche elites. According to our model, the higher elite was obliged to redistribute some of the ritual objects they controlled among the lower ranks to maintain reciprocity and generate dependency links. But introducing foreign ceramic objects into the equation changed the manipulations of symbolic objects, complicating what used to be a fairly simple process. For the first time the Moche higher elites did not entirely controlled the production of the symbolic objects, and the fact that we find them in small numbers indicates that they were in short supply. The solution was apparently to locally generate copies of the foreign ritual objects, some of them still retaining Moche elements, others entirely dependent on foreign forms and designs. These copies were, as we can expect, distributed among the middle and lower ranks of the elite, decreasing in quantity and quality as we descend in the social ladder, in the same way as Moche ceramics with complex iconography did when these were the only fine ceramic objects.

The absence of foreign ceramics throughout most of Moche history indicates a deliberate effort to prevent foreign symbolic objects—that promoted a foreign power strategy—to enter in Moche territory and influence Moche populations. Political or ideological association with this foreign power was of no use to the Moche, especially when they were expanding and vigorous states. So what led them to not only vehemently import foreign symbolic objects, but to also go through the complicated process of copying them? One possibility is that as material wealth these fine objects were simply more prestigious than the local versions, therefore the late Moche copied them
because they acknowledged their intrinsic quality, or technical superiority. In this scenario, owning these foreign precious objects became a matter of prestige and conspicuous consumption for Moche elites (Trigger 1990). Although reasonable, under closer scrutiny this explanation implies an open market economy, in which finely crafted objects are rather automatically more valuable than simpler objects, regardless of their origin and symbolic character, and where exchange of artifacts is not mediated and does not adhere to appropriate ideological preconditions. Explanations of this kind, although not necessarily wrong, are certainly incomplete because they deny the symbolic value of the objects, reducing them to exchange goods only.

Another possibility is that importing and reproducing not only the symbolic objects, but the ideological information they promote, signifies adherence to, or at least an affiliation with, the foreign ideologies. We do see that these foreign objects are not accepted without restrictions: They are reinterpreted and manipulated to fit the Moche canons of production and distribution of symbolic objects. Moche elites did indeed try to restrict the production and distribution of these objects, attempting, therefore, to manipulate this new material expression of ideology as they always had. They did not succeed, and less than one generation after these new types of objects appear, the Moche are gone, this time for good.

Monumental Architecture. One aspect in which the northern and southern Moche are not comparable is in the construction of monumental architecture. The territory controlled by the southern Moche is dotted with some of the most impressive ceremonial pyramids in the New World, such as the Huacas del Sol and de la Luna in the Moche Valley, constructed with more than 100 million adobe bricks (Hastings and Moseley 1975); Huancaco, in the Virú Valley (Willey 1953); and Pañamarca, in the Nepeña Valley (Proulx 1973). In contrast, in the northern Moche territory ceremonial centers, such as Pacatnamú and San José de Moro in the Jequetepeque Valley, are smaller and less impressive.

The differences in the monumental architecture from the northern and southern Moche polities seems to relate to the expansive nature of the southern Moche state. The southern Moche ultimately controlled populations with clearly diverse ethnic backgrounds, but succeeded, surprisingly rapidly, in integrating these populations to the Moche mode of production and geopolitical strategy. This rapid integration of conquered populations to the Moche sphere has been explained by either the militaristic character of Moche society (Wilson 1988), or by assuming a common cultural substratum to all northern coast societies, which facilitated the enculturation process. While these two factors are probably components of the Moche integration strategy, they cannot wholly account for long-term cultural transformations.

It is our impression that one of the most important components of the southern Moche expansive strategy was an ideological infiltration, carefully planned and executed in advance of true geopolitical control, with ceremonial centers of monumental proportions serving as ‘beach-heads’ for this advance. For example, the southernmost valley under Moche influence, the Nepeña Valley, was never totally under Moche control. What Proulx (1973) found while surveying this valley was a Moche ceremonial center of monumental proportions surrounded by residential areas of non-Moche populations. No evidence of Moche domestic settlements was found in the valley. Why do we find a clearly Moche large ceremonial center in a territory that is so obviously non-Moche? This center certainly did not serve the needs of a devoted Moche community, but instead targeted a local population. The investment in such a monument, whether built by Moche or local labor, implies that the state was interested in first occupying the minds of the inhabitants, to ease the latter occupation of their fields.

Among the northern Moche, ideological power did not rely on monumental architecture. Instead, ceremonial events and the production and distribution of symbolic objects were the most important agents for ideological action. These ceremonial events and objects accomplish the difficult task of legitimizing an extremely unequal social structure. The northern Moche were not interested, apparently, in enculturating foreign populations. Their goal seems instead to have been to legitimize the status quo, and to perpetuate their social system.
through the manipulation of ideology. Monumental architecture did not play as important a role in these processes.

Does this means that only expansive societies are forced to develop monumental architecture? Not necessarily. Our point is that to gain and legitimize social power by means of materialized ideology, any society has multiple choices and pathways. Some rely on monumental architecture and its trans-societal integrative powers; others emphasize symbolic activities and objects, and their intra-societal integrative powers.

3.- An Expansionist Empire: The Inka case

During the 15th century A.D., the Inka established dominion over a vast territory reaching from Ecuador to Argentina. Starting as a complex chiefdom with a single ethnic group of probably no more than 100,000, the Inka literally exploded through conquest to build an empire expanding over roughly 350,000 mi² of diverse environments with 8-14 million subjects and more than 100 separate ethnicities. Conquered groups ranged from the great coastal states, like the Chimú, to small-scale tribal societies on the jungle fringe. The Inka ruled using various strategies that ranged from the direct assimilation of groups in strategically important areas to more indirect rule through client elites in more marginal areas (LeVine 1985; D’Altroy 1992).

Materialization of a state ideology was integral to the implementation of state rule in all areas of the empire.

The Inka case illustrates the problems of power confronted by an expansionist empire. Initial conquest relied on an overwhelming military might, and a continued threat of force underlay the state’s domination. A long-term goal, however, seems to have been to solidify and institutionalize the empire’s domination by exporting a state ideology that legitimized the new political order. Materialized ideologies of empires are meant to communicate with conquered peoples who may not share language or customs with their conquerors. By producing standardized ceremonies, symbolic objects, and architectural monuments, the state creates a political culture experienced by all who are incorporated into its territory. The Inka empire of western South America offers a vivid example of how the process of materialization allows for the imposition of an ideology to unify a newly created polity.

Ceremonial Events. Inka ceremonies were the most direct and important element of the relationship between the state and its subjects. Inka ritual hospitality materialized the power and wealth of the state on a grand scale through feasting. After conquering new territory, the state alienated militarily and symbolically all agricultural lands and then reallocated them to the ayllu (a kin-based corporate group) as a demonstration of «Inca omniscient benevolence in action» (Murra 1980:94). By granting land rights back to the community, the Inka legitimized their right to exact tribute. In reality, the state did not interfere with traditional land tenure practices, and the basic subsistence and welfare of its members remained the responsibility of the local community. Much of the state’s revenue came from a labor tax, so that subject groups provided the labor to till agricultural lands set aside for state use. Labor crews also created new state lands (Murra 1980:55-56), formed the military, constructed facilities to house the bureaucracy, and built roads to tie the centers together. The state, in return for these services, hosted work parties in traditional Andean fashion, providing workers with food and chicha beer (Murra 1980:97).

Craig Morris’ excavations at Huánuco Pampa suggests that state hospitality took place on a massive scale (Morris and Thompson 1985). This Inka center is located far from agricultural lands and local settlements, yet its many storehouses contained abundant foodstuffs. At the center of the settlement was a large plaza of 19 hectares. The monumental space suggests the large-scale ceremonies that we know from the early chroniclers took place here. In the excavated assemblage, the dominant ceramic vessel form was the standarized large, high-necked Inka storage vessel, the aryballos. These have been interpreted as liquid storage vessels most probably used to serve chicha (maize beer) in public ceremonies. Morris (1985:485) emphasizes the dominant role played by ceremony and hospitality in the state activities.
Maize was, by all accounts, a prestige crop in Andean society before the conquest; the Inka elaborated its importance and expanded its use in ritual contexts (Murra 1960). The ritual consumption of chicha was a traditional Andean ceremony before the Inka period, and chiefs provided large quantities to their followers. To maintain social and political relationships, chiefs carried heavy jars of chicha along with them as they traveled (Rostworowski 1977). In the Mantaro Valley, Peru, the Inka co-opted the role of host from local elites. In this strategically important region, feasts sponsored by local elites declined in frequency after the Inka conquest (Costin and Earle 1989), prior to which, maize and large liquid storage vessels were found primarily in elite domestic areas, suggesting local hosting by the chiefs. Under the Inka, the consumption of maize greatly increased, especially as seen in the stable isotope ratios of male skeletons (Hastorf 1990), but the maize was no longer limited to the elite households. It is assumed that the local populations must have been receiving the maize as chicha served at state ceremonies. By assuming the role of host, the Inka ensured that the rights to community labor, formerly a political and economic prerogative of local elites, would instead legitimately belong to the state. In a very real sense, the state was ‘earning’ its authority (Morris 1982) directly from the populace. Elaborate rituals were conducted to ensure a productive maize harvest. The Inka himself participated in a yearly planting ritual, and the creation myth of the Inkas also linked them to maize (Murra 1960; Conrad and Demarest 1984).

Feasts were also held to celebrate important events in the royal family and to reward veterans of successful military campaigns. At these feasts, the Inka distributed numerous objects, elaborate food, and chicha. The state religion equated the emperor with the divine god of the sun, Inti, from whom the Inka ruling line directly descended. Religious worship was at the same time a veneration of the emperor (Rowe 1946; Conrad and Demarest 1984). Thus ritual events expressed a complex ideology that venerated the emperor and justified his position.

On a continuing basis, those who labored for the state enjoyed its hospitality and in so doing were directly reminded of the divine nature of its ruler and the vastness of his domain. Because feasts encompassed all of these levels of social and religious meaning, their impact on participants was that much more effective.

Despite their symbolic importance, the state religion and ideology were a political tool. The intentions behind Inka ritual differed from its outward manifestations. Feasts demonstrated, outwardly, an ideology of generosity and reciprocity in a form that was experienced directly by a populace that had little else in common. At the same time, this ideology mystified the existing power relationships and legitimized the position of the emperor.

Public Monuments and Political Landscapes. Architecture, roads, and monuments are permanent symbols that transform a landscape, materializing the presence of a particular group and organizing the landscape in accordance with the social structure and activities of the group. The roads of the Inka empire symbolized the logistical strength and organizational power of the empire (Hyslop 1984). Corvee labor crews constructed over 30,000 km of roads with suspension bridges, causeways, and stairways across the steep Andean terrain. These roads bound the state facilities of the empire together within a tight network of primary and secondary routes. The impressive achievements of Inka labor crews and engineers provide visual evidence of the fundamental militaristic power that underlay and drove Inka expansion. In spite of their military might, the Inka preferred diplomacy to actual combat, relying as much on the threat of force as on its implementation (D’Altroy 1992).

Hyslop (1984:341) writes that «...John Murra has referred to the roads as a ‘flag’ of the Inka state because of their high visibility and the clear ways that they linked the individual to central authority».

Inka architecture is also widely recognized for its massive walls and fine masonry. Equally diagnostic of Inka architectural canons is the
repetition of particular settlement layout and structure forms (Fig. 3). Each major state settlement was dominated by a large central plaza, in the center of which stood the ceremonial platform, the usnu. At one edge of the plaza stood one or more large rectangular buildings, the kallanka, and around the edge were residential compounds in the distinctive rectangular style, the kancha. This uniformity of style most probably carried over to ceremonial practice, creating a common cultural experience through the empire: «[The Inka] made their subjects accept in their towns the same arrangements of shrines, dedicated to diverse deities, that there was in Cuzco, showing them the order in which they were to make sacrifices to each one and for what reason» (Cobo 1979:241). Elements of Inka architecture repeatedly appear together in administrative centers and way stations along the Inka road. The usnu, commonly found in the center of plazas, was particularly important ceremonially, because the emperor stood upon it to address his subjects; in his absence the usnu was a physical reminder of his central role in all proceedings in the plaza.

Outside Cuzco and its immediate environs, Inka builders constructed almost none of the fine, cut-stone masonry that characterizes the finest state buildings in Cuzco. However, the repeated use of the same building forms of Inka construction throughout the empire provided a uniform and recognizable structure to Inka sites in the hinterland (Gasparini and Margolies 1980:66—67). As far south as the Calchaquí Valley, Argentina, 1,500 km south of Cuzco, state installations were carefully modeled after Inka architectural canons. Morris (1982:155), who has argued that provincial centers were centers of state hospitality, emphasizes their artificial nature and separation from the local centers that remained the foci of economic and social life. Inka sites were visual symbols of the power of the state, focal points for ceremony and hospitality.

In the Calchaquí Valley, Argentina, the most elaborate ceremonial site, Potrero de Payogasta, was located about 20 km north of a region of dense local settlements that were clearly under the control of the Inka. Potrero has a large, well-defined plaza, with more than a third of the settlement area given over to the public plaza and usnu complex. Potrero, and not the local centers, probably became under the Inka the setting for feasts (DeMarrais 1993). By removing feasting from local settlements and requiring a special journey to participate in the feasting, the Inka separated local administration and state hospitality. Potrero, like Huánuco Pampa, appears to have been an artificial, intrusive center.

Finally, it seems essential to distinguish the symbolic role of roads and architecture from their functions. Any investment in roads and settlements drew energy and personnel away from subsistence production. At the same time, if a road through a region convinced its inhabitants that state armies were poised to strike, then the short-term costs of its construction may have been well invested. This example demonstrates the mix of strategies, as well as the different forms of materialization, through which the Inkas pursued the long-term goal of securing the empire.

**Symbolic Objects.** In the Inka empire, the political and ritual meaning of symbolic objects were inseparable, created through their direct association with the emperor. Symbolic objects, most importantly cloth and metal, were given as tokens to strengthen alliances, fund new institutions of control, and reward supporters (Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Brumfiel and Earle 1987). D’Altroy and Earle (1985) have suggested that wealth finance was the primary means through which the Inka maintained their relationships with the local managerial ranks. Wealth goods concentrate value in small packages and are easily transported to points of central control.

Finely woven cloth was the most important Inka prestige item; given as gifts to newly conquered peoples, it had strong ceremonial and political significance (Murra 1962).

Although it is true that the women and Indian servants of the [local lords] made clothing for them, it was ordinary and coarse, used only to dress their servants; but the magnificent clothing made or cumbi worn by the caciques and lords could only be made for the Inca, and he handed it out to these lords. Apart from this, at many of the fiestas that were held during the year, as a favor to the lords, caciques, and nobles, the Inca gave out magnificent shirts and blankets, gold and silver
cups, necklaces, bracelets, and other jewels of emeralds, turquoise, and other precious stones set in gold. (Cobo 1979:221).

The gesture of giving was a «priming of the pump» (Murra 1980), meant to create an obligation that, while phrased in terms of reciprocity, would ensure a continuing supply of labor and goods to stock the state’s storehouses.

The Inka nobility monopolized gold and silver, so that «gold and silver had special ritual and political significance [through] their employment by the Inca royal dynasty as symbols of political power used solely by the emperor» (Lechtman 1984:14—15). These goods materialized wealth in their scarcity, but the technological virtuosity achieved by Andean metallurgists and weavers suggests that the Inkas also restricted control of wealth objects through the superior craftsmanship of objects that represented the state. In the Mantaro Valley, the objects of metal recovered archaeologically evidently marked status in both the Inka and pre-Inka periods (Costin and Earle 1989; Owen n.d.). Here and throughout the empire, the shift from local metals to tin bronze suggests that the state took control over the manufacture of the symbolic objects which mixed together both local and statewide symbols.

These parallels in technological processes suggest that, in Andean society, meaning was embedded in, as well as contained in the iconography of, metal and cloth objects (Lechtman 1984). As in the realm of feasting and reciprocity, the Inka were drawing on existing elements of Andean material culture and technology in the production of wealth goods to support the empire. The rich cultural significance of cloth provided a foundation upon which the Inka could elaborate. Similarly, the production of golden alloys could be controlled by the Inka to create a symbolic world of elite privilege expressed in precious metals.

Craft activity, particularly cloth production, was reorganized under state control near Cuzco and in special enclaves, such as the potters who were resettled near Cajamarca by Topa Inca (Rowe 1982). As Inka conquests continued, the ranks of craft specialists and retainers expanded to include attendants and servants (aklla, yana, and mitima) who were no longer simply corvée laborers but full-time attached specialists who converted raw materials into wealth (Murra 1980:154-158; Rowe 1982). These products in turn had both a political and ceremonial importance. The aklla, «chosen women» who wove fine cloth and brewed chicha for the state demonstrate the overlapping spheres of religious and economic activity that characterized Inka Cuzco. Morris and Murra (1976:276) have noted that, in the Inka reorganization of the craft producing sector, «Potters, weavers, or smiths provide the benefits of mass production under workshop conditions, which could be fairly compared with the ‘industrial’ establishments of Europe at the same time». This is a clear example of ideological control maintained through attached specialization.

By understanding how ideologies are given concrete, physical form, we can identify the role of ideological systems in the maintenance and consolidation of political power. Each of the different forms of materialization—ceremonial events, public monuments and landscapes, and symbolic objects—has inherent qualities that are experienced in distinct ways by a subject populace. Especially important for empires are problems of integration and communication over a vast territory. At the same time, the complexity and diversity of imperial economies presents a broad range of strategic choices to their leaders. Through the successful manipulation of ideology, leaders can, and do, radically alter the costs of political domination. The Inkas actively transformed and materialized existing ideologies and institutions to support the goals of the empire. Their success in materializing Inka ideology was integral to the expansion of the empire.
Conclusions

On the surface the three cases chosen for analysis seem diverse and divergent. They come from very different times and places, such that they must be considered historically independent. They are the result of adaptations to strikingly different environments, and different developmental sequences. They also vary greatly in terms of their political scale and complexity, from simple chiefdoms in Denmark, to emergent states in the north coast of Peru, and to the extensive empire of the Inka.

As we examine these cases we see how their economies turned toward centralization, specialization, and diversification; their political organization became increasingly more elaborate, requiring political specialists, recording systems, and a network of political agencies. Their military apparatuses also grew in size, through enforced conscription and full time specialists of war, to cope with the needs of a larger and more populated political entity. Despite the historical and organizational distinctions, ideology was a common source of social power in each case. The emergence and institutionalization of social stratification evidently rested in no small measure on ideological power and its materialization. The process of materialization transformed ideology into events and material things that were produced by the labor of society and owned largely by its leaders.

The three cases illustrate how the different organizational contexts and media of materialization determined the specific uses of ideology, the size and homogeneity of the target populations, the resources available for this type of investment, the willingness to invest in these types of power strategies, and eventually, the outcome of the materialization of ideology. Ceremonial events appear to be the most basic form of materialization. It was an important source of cultural meaning in stratified as well as unstratified societies. Ceremonial events create and recreate narratives that generate and promote social group identity, and that reiterate and legitimize the relative position of social segments, such as in the case of the Funnel Beaker community, in the overriding sanctity of the social hierarchy of the Moche, or the exuberance of the Inca feasts.

These «social narratives» can be transformed into a source of political power in several ways. One costly means is to increase the size and intricacy of the ceremony, such that they require prodigious expenditures or ritual specialists. Alternatively the ceremonies may be tied to other media which are more easily manipulated. Symbolic objects were important elements in the ceremonial dramas of all cases. They signified the social roles and relationships of participants, and encode the narratives of the social order. In the Danish case, the introduction of bronze as the material from which the chiefly swords were made, created an opportunity for control over materialization through control of the attached specialists in charge of their manufacture. Up to this point, the political institutions in Denmark were small in scale. The highly elaborated ceremonial artifacts seen in the burials of the Moche’s «living gods» would have strictly limited the ritual performances to those few individuals controlling the production and distribution of the requisite sophisticated metal and textile elements of the ceremonial attire. The development of a high status elite in Moche society runs parallel to an increasingly closer association with the symbolic system. In this and other ways, social status the Moche states was, therefore, equivalent to preferential access to the symbolic and ceremonial system. The elaboration of materialization through monumental buildings was especially important in the control over ideology in the Inka empire. The size of the monument was a constant remainder of the labor involved in its construction, and its message of political power was elemental and easily read cross-culturally. The monumental construction became the stage for the ceremonies of legitimation that were the essence of the Inka state ideology.

The societies analyzed here are characterized by inter- and intra-class competition and strong tendencies to fragment into smaller political units. In these circumstances ideological systems must continually institutionalize and legitimate an emerging social order. Power strategies based on materialized ideology are characteristically ambivalent and contradictory. While promoting a sense of community and shared participation in the social network, the ideological system enforces social differences and a corresponding
differential distribution of wealth and authority. To this end, manipulating and restricting access to the materialized ideological system is a key mechanism.

Ideologies comprise narratives and stories about the world, its history, and its future. An emerging social segment must promote the ideology that justifies the social domination on which it rests. The ability to mold this ideology, we argue, is restricted by and made powerful through the social and economic processes of its materialization.

**Addendum: The Trap of Ideology**

We have tried to demonstrate how a power strategy based on ideology can contribute to the creation and maintenance of a social order, but, although materialized ideologies have been presented as an effective means to these ends, they are certainly not without problems. At this point several questions are unavoidable. Is it possible for the ideological system to work against the economic base of the social system? In order to perpetuate itself can a ruling elite overexpend on the creation and maintenance of the ideological apparatuses and so weaken the overall social system as to cause its own destruction? This effect of the overextension of ideology we term «the trap of ideology.»

Specific conditions and circumstances set the trap. If the ideological system becomes the principal source of legitimization and power for the ruling elite, the protection and perpetuation of this ideology will likely become one of this group’s most important functions. Not only must the elites invest social capital in ideological apparatuses, they must also prevent other groups from gaining access to these same apparatuses. When these peculiar conditions are set in motion, a social structure and its supporting ideology will have established a relationship of mutual necessity making them completely inseparable. If the ideology collapses, so will the ruling elite.

Social structures under these conditions will be primarily perpetuated by manipulating and maintaining the ideological system, and by recreating and restricting access to it. Although this is true of almost every system that uses ideology to legitimize its social organization, in some cases this association can destroy the whole system by weakening its productive basis. This happens as the ruling elite draws increasingly more resources away from the production of essential goods for use in the production, maintenance, or protection of ideological apparatus. As illustrated by the inflationary competitions among New Guinean big men in the ritual Moka (Strathern 1971), and by the increasingly expensive funerary furnishings of the Moche (Alva and Donnan 1993) and Danish (Bech 1993), this pattern will result in cyclical disruptions and changes in the leadership of society: The same activities and rules that gave elites their power and prominence will end up driving them to their demise. The ruling elites in this case function only to maintain the ruling ideology and the reproduction of the rules that were effective to acquire power, without regard for the mechanisms necessary to maintain the well-being of society. Ideology is no longer a means of power but rather an end in itself.

The trap of ideology can be used to model societal collapse. The expression of a collapse generated by an overexpenditure in ideological apparatuses would be particularly sudden and catastrophic. Archaeologically, we would see a society at what is generally considered its peak of development and achievement, expressed in the high expenditures on art and monumental construction, as well as elaborate ceremonies and ritual events, long-distance trade and consumption of exotic materials, and so on. This peak would be followed by the sudden destruction and abandonment of its structures, the disappearance of its art styles and the dispersal of its population, probably going back to simpler forms of life. Two cases where this scenario seems likely are the collapse of the Moche and the Maya. No foreign invasion, meteorological catastrophe, or other exogenous causes generated these events, although such factors have been known to accelerate or even precipitate the process. In this paradigm, the center loses control over the periphery, and the means of production that imply the control by a centralized authority decay and even disappear. Ideology, therefore, can serve as an agent of social change and catastrophe.

Another expression of the trap of ideology is more subtle and implies more altruistic relationships between individuals and
ideological systems. We have to consider that materialized ideology is composed of physical means to encode and communicate messages, that is, to try to persuade an audience. Whether the message is one of peace and equality, or if it is the legitimization and rationalization of a patent system of inequality, ideologies are most successful when a majority of the population is indeed convinced by their messages. But, can the message also convince the messenger—can the message act over those intended to benefit from it? The question to be asked is not actually if this can happen, because we well know that it can, but if in spite of this happening the ruling elite still can retain the ability to command, manipulate, and restrict access to the ideological system. In other words, is it possible to «believe in» a ritual system, a massive religion, a political doctrine, a peace movement, a charismatic leader, and still be able to not only prevent others from gaining access to this ideology but also to manipulate the messages so that the social system is perpetuated and reproduced? Further research is required to understand the implications of this form of ideological trap.

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Thompson’s discussion of ideology is a good approximation to a critical definition of ideology: «ideologies are meanings, expressed through symbolic forms, that are mobilized in the service of dominant individuals and groups, that is the ways in which the meanings constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms serve, in particular circumstances, to establish and sustain structured social relations from which some individuals and groups benefit more than others, and which some individuals and groups have an interest in preserving while others may seek to contest.» (1990:73).

Only one comparable structure can be found in the Northern Moche territory, the late Moche pyramid of Huaca Grande, in the Pampa Grande complex of the Lambayeque valley (Haas 1985). There is still a heated debate as to whether this structure is the result of an expansion of the southern Moche, and the consequent relocation of the capital in this northerly site (Moseley 1992; Castillo and Donnan 1994). In any case, Huaca Grande is an extremely late phenomenon, constructed with a very peculiar technique that precludes the massive pyramids build in this region during the Lambayeque Period, therefore not comparable to any other previous structure in the northern Moche territory.